



THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BHUTAN’S GNH PILLARS 





Abstract: Bhutan’s national principle of Gross National Happiness 
(GNH) has led to a framework for assessing critical government 
decisions on policies, legislation and individual projects. Human 
well-being such as that envisaged through the pursuit of GNH can, 
in part at least, be achieved through the implementation of the rule 
of law relating to environmental protection. In recent years, the 
concept of the ‘Environmental rule of law’ (ERoL) has evolved as a 
framework to consider the principle of the rule of law within the 
environmental context. It aims to link environmental governance 
and sustainability with fundamental rights and duties. It draws on 
a broad range of rights and duties relevant to the protection of the 
environment, and as such has relevance to the principle of GNH 
and its application. 
This article examines Bhutanese approaches to 
environmental governance inspired by GNH in order to better 
understand how they may coincide with those principles and 
concepts that are incorporated within the concept of ERoL. It 
draws upon the iteration of ERoL developed within UNEP’s ERoL 
Framework (2019) and considers the relationship that specific 
aspects of the Framework have with Bhutan’s approach.  Three 
aspects of Bhutan’s laws and system of environmental 
governance are considered. Firstly, it considers the Constitution of 
Bhutan to evaluate the provisions that it contains relating to the 
rule of law and the protection of the environment.  Second, it 
examines the institutional arrangements and practice for 
implementing and enforcing environmental protection. Finally, it 
considers access to justice and the role of the judiciary in 
achieving GNH within the environmental context.  
The article seeks to highlight the relationship that the good 
governance and environmental conservation pillars of GNH have 
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with key components of the concept of ERoL. It does so to share 
insights that may be of use in furthering the implementation of 
environmental law in Bhutan and which may also demonstrate the 
benefits of adopting Bhutanese approaches to environmental 




This article considers the relationship between Gross National 
Happiness (GNH) and the emerging concept of the 
Environmental Rule of Law (ERoL) within the context of certain 
legal and institutional developments that have taken place in 
Bhutan over the past 15 years. The concept of ERoL has made 
its way into debate relating to environmental governance 
relatively recently. It is based on the centuries old concept of the 
‘rule of law’,1 but with specific application to the protection of the 
environment, and arguably has an important role to play in legal 
reform, the strengthening of institutions, and the 
implementation of environmental law in practice.2 The 
importance of the application of the rule of law within an 
environmental context is seen by many as being crucial if 
environmental rights and duties are to be realised.3 This recent 
focus has led to discussion relating to the possible contents of 
ERoL and different iterations of what the term means have been 
given.4 This analysis will use the version of ERoL provided in the 
first global report produced by the United Nations Environment 
 
1 It can be noted that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) refer 
specifically to the importance of the ‘rule of law’. See SDG 16–Peace, Justice 
and Strong Institutions–Access to justice for all and building effective 
accountable institutions at all levels: United Nations, 
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/ (last visited Jul. 21, 2020).  
2 Jessica Scott, From Environmental Rights to Environmental Rule of Law: A 
Proposal for Better Environmental Outcomes 6(1) Michigan Journal of 
Environmental and Administrative Law 203 (2016); Rule of Law for Nature: 
New Dimensions and Ideas in Environmental Law (Christina Voigt ed., 2013). 
3 Id; see also Andy Raine & Emeline Pluchon, UN Environment–Advancing the 
Environmental Rule of Law in the Asia Pacific 3(1) Chinese J. Envtl. L. 117 
(2019). 
4 See for example the IUCN, World Declaration on the Environmental Rule of 
Law,2016, https://www.iucn.org/commissions/world-commission-
environmental-law/wcel-resources/wcel-important-




in 2019 (ERoL Report) as its basis.5 It is recognised that it is 
likely that as the concept of ERoL evolves, so too will the 
understanding and definition of its contents.  
The concept as enunciated in the ERoL Report has 
potential relevance both to the manner in which environmental 
law is developed and implemented in Bhutan as well as to GNH 
itself. Of the four pillars that make up the concept of GNH, the 
concept of ERoL has particular relevance to the environmental 
conservation and good governance pillars for obvious reasons.6 
Precisely what the relationship is between the concept of ERoL 
and GNH, is a question that requires detailed analysis if a deeper 
understanding is to be attained.  
Prior to embarking on this analysis, it is worth clarifying 
the core components of both the concept of ERoL and GNH as 
they relate to the environment and governance. The ERoL Report 
describes ERoL as being the status when laws are widely 
understood, respected, and enforced and the benefits of 
environmental protection are enjoyed by people and the planet.7 
A key component of the report focuses on the need for 
environmental law to be clear and comprehensive and to be 
properly implemented and enforced.8 It notes the significant 
‘implementation gap’ that exists within many countries, whether 
developed or developing in status, in terms of the impact of laws 
on human health and well-being.9 It provides a breakdown of the 
elements that are at the core of ERoL which is as follows: 
 
a) Fair, Clear and Implementable Environmental Laws. 
b) Access to Information, Participation and Access to 
Justice.  
c) Accountability and Integrity of Institutions and Decision-
Makers. 
d) Clear and Coordinated Mandates and Roles, Across and 
Within Institutions. 
 
5 United Nations Environment Programme, Environmental Rule of Law: First 
Global Report 1 (2019). 
6 UNGA, ‘2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (2015). 






e) Accessible, Fair, Impartial, Timely and Responsible 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms. 
f) Recognition of Mutually Reinforcing Relationship 
between Rights and the Environmental Rule of Law. 
g) Specific criteria for the Interpretation of the 
Environmental Law.10 
 
At the core of the concept of ERoL is the aim of fostering 
increased compliance among governments, industry, and civil 
society collectively with environmental laws.11 As an important 
part of this, it seeks to improve the institutional practice and 
governance related to the protection of the environment.12 
When considering GNH in this context, it is important to 
bear in mind that GNH is not intended to have the same role or 
function that the concept of ERoL has. It is based on Mahayana 
Buddhist philosophy, and provides a broad set of principles and 
policies, that government and society should be seeking to 
attain and maintain. Those principles, policies and goals are 
encapsulated in its four pillars which are good governance, 
sustainable socio-economic development, cultural preservation, 
and environmental conservation. The ultimate goal of GNH is to 
advance and maximize the collective happiness of the 
Bhutanese people.13 It is clear that GNH has a much broader 
purpose than the concept of ERoL, however it is also clear that 
there is a potential overlap between their purposes. As of 2015, 
in accordance with the GNH Survey Report, the governance pillar 
of GNH has been broken down into three main categories which 
are: political participation, people’s perception of government 
performance, and fundamental rights and freedom.14 The 
‘environmental conservation’ pillar of GNH encompasses areas 
such as pro-environmental beliefs and behaviours of the people, 
environmental issues faced by people, human-wildlife conflicts, 
 
10 UNEP (n 5) 20-6. 
11 Id. at 13. 
12 Scott, supra note 2, at 222. 
13 Lyonpo Sonam Tobgye, The Constitution of Bhutan: Principles and 
Philosophies 188-189 (2015). 
14 Centre for Bhutan Studies and GNH Research, A Compass Towards a Just 




and fuel uses.15 These areas of GNH clearly correlate with some 
of the core elements of the concept of ERoL. 
It is not possible within this context of this article to 
provide a complete analysis of all aspects of environmental 
governance in Bhutan vis-à-vis the ERoL Report. Therefore, 
specific core components have been selected to provide a 
representative evaluation. As such the authors have selected the 
national Constitution,16 certain key institutions that play an 
important role within government and governance of the 
environment, and the laws and processes relating to access to 
justice in environmental matters. Within these areas of law and 
governance, the analysis itself is focused on three areas of 
enquiry. Firstly, it examines the extent to which those laws, 
principles, institutions and practices within Bhutan demonstrate 
a clear overlap and consonance between GNH policy and the 
approaches advocated within the ERoL Report. Secondly, it 
considers aspects of the ERoL Report that could potentially have 
application in supporting Bhutan in furthering GNH through its 
laws, principles, institutions and practice. Thirdly, it focuses on 
those environmental laws, principles, institutions and practices 
that are part of GNH policy, which either appear to go further in 
protecting the environment than the implicit or explicit values 
found within the concept of ERoL or which demonstrate lacunae 




This section focuses on the national Constitution. It proceeds by 
analysing the relevant provisions of the Constitution and 
considers the overall impact of GNH as a developmental policy. 
The 2008 Constitution itself represented an important point in 
Bhutanese political history where the nation took a concrete 
step to move from the former absolute monarchy to a 
 
15 Id. at 211. 
16 The Constitution for the Kingdom of Bhutan 2008, 
https://www.nab.gov.bt/en/business/constitution_of_bhutan 




democratic constitutional monarchy.17 Under the leadership of 
the Third King, Jigme Dorji Wangchuk (1952-72), a period of 
reform had taken place in the country which included significant 
modernisation of  the political system and the introduction of a 
130 member legislature.18 It also resulted in increased contact 
with other countries and membership of the United Nations in 
1971.19 Following this period, the Fourth King, Jigme Singye 
Wangchuk (1972-2008) continued this process with further 
steps that included greater participation of the people in 
government and a programme of change that had the aim of  
modernising the country  without it losing its culture and spiritual 
heritage.20 Significantly he introduced the concept of GNH as an 
approach to economic and societal development in 1972.21  In 
2001 the King made the decision that a national constitution 
should be drafted which resulted in an extensive consultation 
process prior to its ultimate adoption.22 As such the analysis in 
this section requires an approach that takes into account the 
spiritual heritage of the country, the role of the Monarchy as well 
as the approach that the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGoB) 
takes to economic development and ‘well-being’.23 
Although Buddhism is not recognised in the Constitution 
as the ‘national religion’, Art. 3(1) states that, ‘Buddhism is the 
spiritual heritage of Bhutan, which promotes the principles and 
values of peace, non-violence, compassion and tolerance.’24 In 
 
17 Sarish Sebastian, Parliamentary Democracy in Bhutan–A Journey from 
Tradition to Modernity 112 (2015); also Whinnie Bothe, The Monarch’s Gift: 
Critical notes on the constitutional process in Bhutan 40 European Bulletin of 
Himalayan Research 27, 54 (2012). 
18 Shera Lhundup, The Genesis of Environmental Ethics and Sustaining its 
Heritage in the Kingdom of Bhutan 14 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 693, 699 (2001-
2); Leo E. Rose, The Politics of Bhutan 126 (1977). 
19 Lhundup, Id at 699. 
20 Sebastian, supra note 17 at 68-84. 
21 Sebastian, supra note 17 at 69; Wen Chen Chang, Li-ann Thio, Kevin Y.L. 
Tan and Jiunn-rong Yeh (eds) Constitutionalism in Asia – Cases and 
Materials 107 (Hart Publishing 2014); Dhurba Rizal, The Royal Semi-
Authoritarian Democracy of Bhutan 71 (2015). 
22 Sebastian, supra note 17 at 11; Lhundup supra note 18 at 699. 
23 Stephen J. Turner, The Constitution of Bhutan: A Quantitative Environmental 
Standard in Environmental Rights – The Development of Standards 324-7 (S.J. 
Turner et al eds., 2010). 




particular, Mahayana Buddhism is a branch of Buddhism that 
respects all forms of life and is prohibitive of hunting and 
fishing.25 This affects the views that the RGoB and the people of 
Bhutan have relating to nature, the environment and the way that 
it should be treated.26 Therefore there is a very strong and 
natural  relationship between Buddhism and the principle of 
GNH. Priesner states that, ‘Buddhism is the single most 
important determinant for…the core concept for ‘Gross National 
Happiness’.27 The Fourth King introduced the concept of GNH 
itself in 1972 and it clearly embodied a reflection of the spiritual 
heritage and values of the country. 
In terms of the direct relationship between ERoL and 
GNH within the Constitution, it can be noted that GNH is 
recognised in Art. 9(2) of the Constitution as a ‘fundamental 
principle’.28 GNH has a number of functions within and for the 
Government, however for the purposes of this article, the key 
role that it plays is in acting as a determinant in decisions 
relating to the environment whether they be in law, general policy 
or planning.29 This is reflected in the Government renaming the 
Planning Commission as the ‘Gross National Happiness 
Commission’ in 2008.30 The concept of ERoL is relatively new 
and therefore it would not be expected to be referred to in 
national constitutions at this point. However, the concept of the 
‘Rule of Law’ itself is mentioned twice. It appears with reference 
 
25 Lhundup, supra note 18, at 699. 
26 RGoB–Ministry of Agriculture, ‘Biodiversity Action Plan for Bhutan’, (final 




ew, 34 (last visited Jul. 21, 2020). 
27 Stefan Priesner, Gross National Happiness: Bhutan’s Vision of Development 
and its challenges in Indigeneity and Universality in Social Science: A South 
Asian Response 212, 223 (Partha Nath Mukherji & Chandan Sengupta eds., 
2004). 
28 Art. 9(2) states that, ‘[t]he State shall strive to promote those conditions 
that will enable the pursuit of Gross National Happiness.’ 
29 See Gross National Happiness Commission, https://www.gnhc.gov.bt/en/ 
(last visited Jul. 21,2020). 
30 Executive Order PM/01/08/895 (January 24, 




to the responsibilities of the judiciary,31 and also within Art. 9 that 
refers to the ‘Principles of State Responsibility’ where it states 
that Bhutan should endeavour to, ‘create a civil society free of 
oppression, discrimination and violence, based on the rule of 
law, protection of human rights and dignity, and to ensure the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the people.’32 
The Constitution also contains in Art. 5, a number of 
provisions that are all dedicated to the protection of the 
environment. When considering the contents of Art. 5, it is clear 
that it corresponds in many respects to environmental 
provisions that are included in other constitutions around the 
world.33 Arts. 5(1) and 5(2) relate to the duties of Bhutanese 
citizens and the Government respectively to protect the 
environment and Arts. 5(4) and 5(5) refer to the responsibility of 
Parliament in creating legislation and its right to declare 
protected areas and national parks respectively. There are also 
other provisions within the constitution that have an 
environmental dimension.  For example, Art. 7(1) contains the 
‘right to life’34 and Art. 1(12) relates to the State’s rights of 
ownership of the mineral resources, rivers, lakes and forests.35 
These provisions would not look out of place in the constitutions 
of many other countries. 
However, Art. 5(3) is remarkable and unique as it 
provides a high quantitative standard relating to a specific 
aspect of the environment.36 It requires that, ‘[t]he Government 
shall ensure that, in order to conserve the country’s natural 
resources and to prevent degradation of the ecosystem, a 
minimum of 60 percent of Bhutan’s total land shall be 
maintained under forest cover for all time.’37 This policy had 
been introduced in the 1970s and therefore the provision in the 
constitution did not change the prior approach to forest 
 
31 The Constitution for the Kingdom of Bhutan, art. 21 § 3. See section 4 
below. 
32 The Constitution for the Kingdom of Bhutan, art. 9 § 3. 
33 See generally J.R. May & E. Daly, Global Environmental Constitutionalism 
(2014); also in relation to Asia specifically see Wen-Chen Chang et al., 
Constitutionalism in Asia–Cases and Materials 1019-22 (2014). 
34 The Constitution for the Kingdom of Bhutan, art. 7 § 1.  
35 The Constitution for the Kingdom of Bhutan. 
36 Turner, supra note 21, at 323-41. 




conservation but re-affirmed and strengthened it. However, 
provisions in national constitutions are normally stated in 
oblique qualitative terms that leave much room for 
interpretation.38 It appears that the only other nation that has 
incorporated anything similar is Kenya, which in its 2010 
constitution included a provision that required the country to 
work to achieve and maintain 10 percent of the country under 
forest cover.39 
It could be argued that the emphasis on environmental 
protection and GNH in the Constitution affects the interpretation 
and application of other provisions. For example, Art 9(10) 
states that the Government should, ‘foster private sector 
development through fair market competition and prevent 
commercial monopolies.’ In the context of commercial activity, 
Bhutan’s approach is influenced by GNH and as such is different 
to that of many western economies. This can be illustrated by 
the example of the Gedu plywood factory which had been 
financed by a loan from Kuwait.40 In spite of the significant 
projected economic benefits of the project, the Forest 
Department severely limited the number of trees that could be 
felled to supply the factory to the extent that it could only operate 
at 15 percent of capacity. This meant that it was unable to 
operate profitably and ultimately had to close.41 
Where the Government has taken careful measures to 
protect the environment, its approaches have been to exercise 
direct state control of natural resources such as forests, to 
adopt and implement Five-Year plans and incorporate strict 
 
38 Turner, supra note 35; also T.P. Wangdi et al, An Analysis of Forestry Policy, 
Acts and Rules of Bhutan to Mainstream Climate Change Adaptation. Regional 
Climate Change Adaptation Knowledge Platform for Asia, Stockholm 
Environment Institute, Partner Report Series No. 13, 2013, 
https://www.weadapt.org/sites/weadapt.org/files/legacy-new/knowledge-
base/files/521c8788e61b3bhutan-serie-13-cs5-v7-for-web.pdf  (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2020). 
39 The Constitution of Kenya (2010) art. 69 § b. 
40 Gedu Plywood Factory Shut Down 4(1) The Bhutan Review Monthly 1(1996), 
http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/bhutanreview/pdf/T
BR_04_01.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2020) 
41 Stefan Priesner , Gross National Happiness – Bhutan’s Vision of 
Development and its Challenges in Gross National Happiness: Discussion 
Papers 24, 50 (1999), http://crossasia-repository.ub.uni-




regulation of private enterprise. These approaches to 
environmental protection are not consistent with many of the 
approaches taken to environmental protection that are evident 
in ‘western democracies’ where market mechanisms and the 
use of non-mandatory governance approaches appear to have 
much greater influence. It is here that there is a discernible 
difference between the approach adopted by Bhutan through its 
application of the principle of GNH to that which is implicit or 
explicitly stated within the ERoL Report. 
The ERoL Report does not provide the same type of 
challenge to the consumption of natural resources that the 
approach adopted through GNH and Bhutan’s Constitution does. 
As such it does not explicitly or implicitly warn against the 
unfettered consumption of natural resources in the way that the 
Bhutanese Constitution provides constraint.42  For example the 
ERoL Report states that ERoL serves to encourage “inclusive 
equitable economic growth; support investment and promote 
competition; provide access to information and markets for the 
poor and marginalized; secure land and property title; and 
provide mechanisms for equitable commercial dispute 
resolution.”43 While there may be truth in this, it is clear also that 
economic growth is often responsible for levels of consumption 
that lead to widespread degradation of the environment through 
increased greenhouse gas emissions, increased levels of 
pollution, increased losses of biodiversity and increased levels 
of waste.44 
The ERoL Report states that, 
 
[a]n extensive body of empirical studies and literature 
documents the critical importance of strong institutions to 
growth; in fact, institutions are the key determinant of 
economic growth, more important than trade integration or 
 
42 With the exception of the Foreword, the text of the ERoL Report does not 
make reference to ecological ‘planetary boundaries’. 
43 UNEP, supra note 5, at 18; see also International Development Law 
Organisation, Doing Justice to Sustainable Development Integrating the Rule 
of Law into the Post-2015 Development Agenda ( 2014). 





geographic variables.45 Studies estimate that a one-standard 
deviation jump in the quality of institutions in a country results 
in a four-to six-fold increase in per-capita income.46 Other 
research similarly links strong institutions to better 
development outcomes, including higher per capita income.47 
 
It can be argued that while strong institutions are desirable, they 
are only effective in protecting the environment if they are 
integrated with approaches to economic development that 
genuinely lead to positive outcomes for the environment. This 
aspect of the drafting of the ERoL Report is one which 
comparison with the Bhutanese Constitution and experience 
exposes. 
A final example of the dissonance between the economic 
assumptions made within the ERoL Report and the Bhutanese 
approach to economic growth through the principle of GNH, is 
found in its affirmation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a 
measure of successful economic growth. It states, ‘[t]his 
connection between environmental rule of law and economic 
growth is reflected in various development indices that link 
different elements of environmental rule of law both to growth 
in gross domestic product and to a decrease in inflation and 
inequality.’48 The adoption of GNH as an alternative approach to 
GDP and as an indicator of socio-economic progress by Bhutan, 
demonstrates the significant gap in the objectives that are 
assumed within the ERoL Report when compared to Bhutan. 
 
45 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Performance (1990); see also Douglass C. North et al, Governance, Growth, 
and Development Decision-making (2008).  
46 Dani Rodrik et al, Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions 
over Integration and Geography in Economic Development, NBER Working 
Paper No. 9305 (2002), Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research,https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w9305/w9305
.pdf  (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). 
47 UNEP, supra note 5, at 38; see also Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-Lobaton, 
Governance Matters Working Paper WPS 2196. World Bank, Washington, DC 
(1999), https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-
reports/documentdetail/665731468739470954/governance-matters (last 
visited Feb. 12,2021). 
48 UNEP, supra note 5, at 18; see also, Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, 
Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going? 23(1) The 




Through the ecological limits on economic growth that are 
inherent in the principle of GNH, it can be argued that GNH goes 
much further than the ERoL Report itself does in recognising 
ecological planetary boundaries and responding appropriately.49 
These observations do not represent criticisms of the 
concept of ERoL itself, but they raise questions of the types of 
economic systems or economic developmental models that are 
explicitly or implicitly represented as being favourable within the 
ERoL Report. They also demonstrate the importance of key 
provisions within Bhutan’s national constitution that go further 
than many other national constitutions in providing constraints 




An important aspect of the principle of ‘rule of law’ itself is the 
relationship that it has with institutions. Bugge emphasises that, 
‘the rule of law is the principle that law is the supreme factor in 
the relationship between the authorities and the citizen as well 
as between citizens with conflicting interests. It means that all 
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including 
the state itself, are governed by established laws and 
accountable to legal institutions.’50 It is therefore of little 
surprise that in the emerging concept of ERoL, the function that 
institutions play in the creation, implementation and 
enforcement of environmental law is of crucial importance.51 
Enforcement and implementation of environmental law in 
particular, have long been challenging issues for governments, 
communities and citizens, as they often highlight gaps between 
 
49 Ritu Verma, Gross National Happiness: meaning, measure and degrowth in a 
living development alternative 24(1) J. Political Ecology 476 (2017). 
50 Hans Christian Bugge, Twelve Fundamental Challenges in Environmental 
Law: An Introduction to the Concept of Rule of Law for Nature in Rule of Law 
for Nature: New Dimensions and Ideas in Environmental Law 105 (Christina 
Voigt ed., 2013). 




the intention of a legislature and the reality of environmental 
governance in practice.52 
Environmental institutions, such as national environment 
ministries and other sector-specific ministries are the most 
prominent institutions in this regard as they can have 
environmental legal development, standard setting and 
enforcement functions but it must be noted that other executive 
branches of government such as ministries of finance and 
education can also play important roles.53 It is clear that in any 
jurisdiction, the failure of institutions to implement and enforce 
environmental law in whichever field of governance or sector 
concerned, can potentially lead to ‘broader institutional 
weakness’54 and result in both degradation of the environment 
and human suffering. This was clearly recognised at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
in 1992 through the recommendations of Agenda 21 which 
stated that, ‘the ability of a country to follow sustainable 
development paths is determined to a large extent by the 
capacity of its people and its institutions….’.55 All countries have 
specific challenges in this regard which are determined by 
economic, developmental, cultural, geographical and ecological 
 
52 LeRoy C Paddock et al., Compliance and Enforcement of Environmental 
Law–Towards More Effective Implementation (2011); Paul Martin & Amanda 
Kennedy, Implementing Environmental Law (2017); Martina Padmanabhan & 
Volker Beckmann, Institutions and Sustainability: Introduction and Overview in 
Institutions and Sustainability – Political Economy of Agriculture and the 
Environment – Essays in Honour of Konrad Hagedorn 1, 17 (Volker 
Beckmann & Martina Padmanabhan eds., , 2009).   
53 Naysa Ahuja et al., Advancing human rights through environmental rule of 
law in Human Rights and the Environment 18 (James May & Erin Daly eds., 
2019). 
54 Daniel Kaufmann, Evidence-Based Reflections on Natural Resource 
Governance and Corruption in Africain Africa at a Fork in the Road: Taking Off 
or Disappointment Once Again 239-60 (Oliver Ernest Zedillo & Haynie Wheeler 
eds., 2015), https://ycsg.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/africa.pdf  (last 
visited Feb 14,  2021). 
55 United Nations Sustainable Development 1992, Agenda 21. United Nations 
Conference on Environment & Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 
June 1992, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf,p




factors. This is no less the case in South Asia in general and 
Bhutan itself also faces its own challenges.56 
This section will examine key institutions that are 
responsible for upholding environmental law and policy in 
Bhutan. First, it assesses the role of the Gross National 
Happiness Commission (GNHC) as a direction-setting apex 
body that underscores sustainability, environmental protection, 
and good governance to promote collective happiness. Second, 
it reviews the powers and functions of the National Environment 
Commission (NEC) to identify any implementation gaps in the 
enforcement of the National Environmental Protection Act 
(NEPA), and to explore how application of some of the elements 
that the ERoL Report contains could potentially assist in 
improving institutional practice. Lastly, it briefly mentions the 
relevance of the Anti-Corruption Commission and the role that it 
plays in institutional integrity across all public agencies 
including those dealing with environmental matters. 
 
A. Gross National Happiness Commission 
 
The GNHC ensures that socio-economic development policies 
and overall national plans and programs are guided by the 
‘overarching philosophy’ of GNH and its four pillars.57 This key 
national planning and executing agency was first established as 
the Planning Commission in the 1970s. When it was re-named 
in 2008, its role in fulfilling Art. 9(2) of the Constitution was 
emphasized.58 From its direction-setting role in the development 
of policy formulation and Five-Year Plans, to a body that reviews, 
surveys, monitors and evaluates efficient implementation of 
policies and plans, the GNHC Secretariat undertakes different 
functions at various levels of policy and program-making to 
ensure that Bhutan develops in accordance with the principles 
of GNH.59 As Andelman puts it, ‘[e]very Government initiative, 
 
56 Parvez Hassan, Good Environmental Governance: Some Trends in the South 
Asian Region 18 Asia Pac. J. Intl. L. 169 (2016).  
57 Gross National Happiness Commission (GNHC), About us (2020) 
https://www.gnhc.gov.bt/en/?page_id=47 (last visited Jul. 22,  2020).  
58 Executive Order PM/01/08/895 (Jan. 24, 2008), 
https://www.gnhc.gov.bt/en/ (last visited Jul.21, 2020).  




every law, every investment must be run past the GNH 
Commission. If it doesn’t pass muster, it doesn’t happen.’60 The 
GNHC is also responsible for the development of governmental 
budgets and for monitoring the allocation of resources for the 
Five-Year Plans.61 
With good governance recognized as one of the main 
pillars of GNH62 and the rule of law recognized by the 
Constitution,63 the GNHC will be expected to promote the rule of 
law vis-à-vis its overarching policy goals. It has been argued 
within the context of Bhutan that the obligation of the State is to 
create a free, democratic society founded on the rule of law, and 
that, ‘[a] king loves his people; his people desire happiness; the 
source of people’s happiness is rule of law.’64 The GNHC itself 
highlighted the strong link between the GNH pillar of good 
governance and the rule of law in 2002 by stating that, ‘[g]ood 
governance describes a government that promotes the greatest 
well-being and happiness for its citizens, and it also entails 
integrity, accountability, and transparency in governmental 
practices.’65 
One objective of the GNHC is to strengthen the 
environmental pillar which clearly intersects with that relating to 
sustainable economic development.66 It could therefore be 
argued that the role of the GNHC, by implication, is to promote 
ERoL and improve the governmental practice of environmental 
institutions. It is possible to point to examples where the stated 
purposes of the GNHC and that of the concept of ERoL as set 
out in the ERoL Report do correspond. One example relates to 
the official function of the GNHC to, ‘ensure cross sectoral 
coordination and resolution of issues for effective 
 
60 David A. Andelman, Bhutan, Borders and Bliss 27(1) World Policy Journal 
103, 110 (2010). 
61 Id., see ‘Functions’. 
62 The Bhutanese, Good Governance, Main Pillar of GNH, The Bhutanese,June 
21, 2014,https://thebhutanese.bt/good-governance-main-pillar-of-gnh/ (last 
visited Aug. 1,  2020). 
63 The Constitution for the Kingdom Bhutan 2008, art 9 § 3. 
64 Tobgye, supra note 13, at 189. 
65 Michael S. Givel, Gross National Happiness in Bhutan: Political Institutions 
and Implementation,Asian Affairs 102, 111 (2015) . 




implementation of policies and plans.’67 As the ‘apex strategic 
body’,68 the GNHC ‘ensures cohesion between sectoral policies 
and alignment with the national development objectives and 
GNH’.69 The GNHC has the Prime Minister as the chairperson, 
the Minister of Finance as the vice-chair, and the GNHC 
Secretariat has representative members throughout all of the 
key ministries including the NEC.70 Further, the 12th Five-Year 
Plan (2018-2023) envisages improvement in inter-ministerial 
(horizontal integration) across different levels of governance 
(vertical integration), coordination and collaboration.71 By 
integrating cross-cutting issues of governance and 
environmental protection in policies, plans, and program, the 
GNHC’s practices correspond with some of the 
recommendations of the ERoL Report which highlights the need 
for co-ordination across sectors as well as  multi-agency and 
multi-level coordination.72 
As the central executing agency responsible for 
advancing GNH, an important function of the GNHC is to lead 
monitoring and evaluation processes to track the progress of 
national development goals and to provide feedback and early 
warning on a timely basis. These functions similarly are 
consistent with the recommendations of the ERoL Report.73 The 
National Monitoring and Evaluation System (NMES) was 
instituted by the GNHC for the above purposes, but these efforts 
have been marred with implementation gaps due to lack of data 
and limited technical capacity. Ineffective functioning of the 
NMES during the 11th Five-Year Plan reportedly resulted in the 
GNHC not carrying out annual monitoring of planned activities, 
producing inconsistent documentation and inaccurate reporting 
on performance indicators for national and sectoral key 
 
67 GNHC, supra note 58. 
68 Givel, supra note 66, at 113 (citing Dasho Karma Ura). 
69 GNHC, supra note 55. 
70 GNHC, supra note 58, see ‘Secretariat Composition’; see also Givel, supra 
note 69. 
71 Gross National Happiness Commission, Twelfth Five Year Plan 2018–2023 
(Main Document, Vol. 1, Thimphu, Bhutan 2018). 
72 UNEP, supra note 5, at 35, 52-55. 




results.74 The Royal Audit Authority highlighted the relevance of 
rigorous stakeholder consultative processes in the development 
of monitoring tools to ensure effective implementation 
consistent with national goals.75 It is possible that as is the case 
in many countries, the capacity of governmental bodies in 
Bhutan to fulfil all of their functions effectively is subject to 
resource limitations.  
From an international perspective, it can be seen that the 
GNHC is an unusual type of governmental body in that it has the 
function of promoting and integrating a country specific 
approach to social, economic, environmental and cultural 
development throughout the breadth of the ministries of the 
country. While the ERoL Report does stress the need for 
coordination between ministries and government agencies in 
relation to the environment, it does not specifically refer to the 
type of model (represented through the GNHC) that Bhutan has 
adopted.76 As such further work would be required to assess the 
comparative advantages and disadvantages in the coordination 
of environmental law and policy that is adopted by Bhutan. It is 
certainly true that in many countries environmental agencies or 
ministries are given a lower profile, less resources and less 
power than other ministries. Therefore, the model of the GNHC 
in Bhutan, with the role that it has in relation to the environmental 
and governance pillars of GNH, presents a very interesting 
alternative that should arguably be explored. 
 
B. National Environment Commission 
 
The National Environment Commission (NEC) is the high-level 
autonomous agency of the Royal Government of Bhutan.77 It is 
mandated to look after all matters relating to the environment in 
Bhutan, including the regulation of environmental impacts and 
 
74 Kuensel, 11th Plan monitoring and evaluation tool defunct during plan 
period,Kuensel Online, March 6, 2020, https://kuenselonline.com/11th-plan-
monitoring-and-evaluation-tool-defunct-during-plan-period/ (last visited Jul. 
27,  2020). 
75 Id. 
76 UNEP, supra note 5, at 52-55. 




the promotion of sustainable environment.78 The NEC was 
established in 1990 to further the broad principles of the Paro 
Resolution on Environment and Sustainable Development, in 
other words to balance economic development with 
environmental protection and sustainable use of natural 
resources.79 In order to ensure that environmental issues 
become central to Bhutan’s development agenda, the NEC has 
been responsible for drafting and coordinating the National 
Environment Strategy of 1998 entitled ‘The Middle Path’,80 the 
‘Bhutan 2020 Vision’ development plan,81 and other key national 
instruments such as the National Environmental Protection Act 
of 2007 (NEPA). 
In a way, the role of NEC is closely tied to the principles 
embodied in these key national instruments which emphasize 
Bhutan’s ‘middle path’ approach to development and which 
recognize GNH as the central development concept. The Bhutan 
2020 Vision development plan identified the need to improve 
technical capacity and institutional arrangements to undertake 
environmental impact assessments as a means to achieve its 
goal elaborated as follows: 
 
Gross National Happiness does not regard economic growth 
as being unimportant. On the contrary, it is an important 
means for achieving higher ends. The challenge is one of 
finding the balance between material and non-material 
dimensions of development.82 
 
78 National Environment Commission (NEC), The Middle Path – National 
Environmental Strategy 2020, NES, 2019, http://www.nec.gov.bt/necs/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/NES-English_web.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2021); 
see also National Environment Commission, 2021, 
http://www.nec.gov.bt/necs/vision-mission/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2021), 
(search for Mandate’ and ‘Mission’).       
79 NEC, The Middle Path–National Environmental Strategy for Bhutan 14 
(1998). 
80 Id. 
81 Planning Commission Secretariat, Bhutan 2020: A Vision for Peace, 
Prosperity and Happiness–Part 
I,1999,https://www.ircwash.org/resources/bhutan-2020-vision-peace-
prosperity-and-happiness last visit Feb. 6, 2021).      
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With the purpose of ‘finding the balance’, the NEC was first 
enshrined under the Environmental Assessment Act 2000 
(EAA),83 followed by NEPA 2007, the Waste Prevention and 
Management Act 2009 (WPMA),84 and the Water Act 2011 (WA) 
85 as the key agency responsible for enforcing environmental 
legislative provisions. The Preamble to NEPA notes that 
environmental sustainability is an important element of GNH 
philosophy and recognizes a need to create institutional 
mechanisms to protect the fragile ecosystem,86 and thus, the 
NEC is also responsible for promoting GNH in the country.  
The NEPA is core to the functioning of environmental 
protection in Bhutan.87 It does not specifically mention the 
concept of ERoL, however, it recognizes various principles that 
correspond with those emphasised in the EROL Report.88 It 
includes the substantive right to safe and healthy environment,89 
and procedural rights such as the rights to information,90 access 
to justice,91 and public participation in environmental decision-
making.92 In fact, to widen the civic space in environmental 
matters, the NEC membership also includes three 
representatives from civil society.93 Therefore, together the NEC 
and the NEPA are central to operationalizing and advancing a 
number of the principles and laws that are understood to form 
part of the concept of ERoL.   
 
<https://docplayer.net/amp/22916529-Bhutan-2020-a-vision-for-peace-
prosperity-and-happiness.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2021).   
83 Environment Assessment Act 2000, Chapter V. 
84 Waste Prevention and Management Act 2009, Chapter V. 
85 Water Act of Bhutan 2011, Chapter 3. 
86 NEPA 2007, Preamble. 
87 NEPA 2007. 
88 NEPA 2007, Ch. II [recognizes principle of inter-generational equity (§6), 
sustainable development (§4 and 7), public participation (§ 18), 
precautionary principle (§8), polluter pays principle (§12)]. 
89 NEPA 2007 § 5. 
90 NEPA 2007 §15. (See also § 87) [NEC is required to operate an 
environmental information system and produce a report on the status of 
environmental conditions in the country on a regular basis]. 
91 NEPA 2007 § 16. 
92 NEPA 2007 § 86. 




However, the ERoL Report goes further in elaborating on 
specific characteristics that environmental institutions should 
exhibit to demonstrate that they can function in accordance with 
the concept of ERoL.94 This potentially provides a useful basis 
for any environmental institution to conduct self-assessment 
and review. It highlights a number of characteristics as being 
particularly important to inculcate effective implementation and 
enforcement of environmental law and policy. These 
characteristics include: clear and appropriate mandates, 
institutional and personnel capacity, independent audit and 
performance reviews, the collection and use of reliable data, 
coordination across sectors and institutions, fair and consistent 
enforcement of law, and leadership to fight corruption and build 
compliance.95 The following provides comment on some of 
these within the context of the NEC and other associated 
agencies in Bhutan. 
 
1. Clear and appropriate mandates 
 
Clear and appropriate mandates that delineate the extent of an 
institution’s authority, functions, and goals are arguably vital in 
the implementation and enforcement of environmental law.96 
They help institutions prioritize their efforts, they provide clarity 
to other agencies on their purposes, and they assist citizens in 
holding institutions to account.97 The NEC is the apex executive 
body responsible for environmental matters and clearly, its 
primary responsibility is to enforce and administer the 
provisions of NEPA.98 The NEC’s functions are set out in NEPA, 
 
94 UNEP, supra note 5, at 45. 
95 Id. at 44-80,describes the seven key characteristics of effective 
environmental institutions, provides supporting empirical studies, and 
illustrates different forms in which environmental institutions across the 
globe demonstrate such characteristics.  
96  Kai Wegrich & Vid Štimac, Coordination Capacity in The Problem-Solving 
Capacity of the Modern State: Governance Challenges and Administrative 
Capacities (Martin Lodge & Kai Wegrich eds.,2014). 
97 UNEP, Manual on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements,Nairobi, Kenya (UNEP, 2006) illustrates Jamaica’s 
institutional arrangement for environmental governance with clear 
jurisdictional boundaries on specific environmental issues. 




and other aforementioned legislation. These include taking 
specific measures to prevent environment harm;99 adopting a 
list of projects requiring project screening and environmental 
clearance;100 designating expert agencies as ‘Competent 
Authorities’ to conduct project screening, environmental 
assessments and issue or deny clearances; enforcing and 
implementing policies, plans and programs for environmental 
protection, among others.101 NEPA empowers the NEC to 
establish an environmental tribunal if it decides to do so.102 
While this power could potentially advance access to justice, 
NEPA does not provide any specific criteria for the NEC to do so. 
Interestingly, NEPA also empowers the NEC to assume the role 
of a civil court when hearing cases before it.103 This confluence 
of executive and judicial functions within one agency deviates 
from the democratic principle of separation of powers enshrined 
in the Bhutanese Constitution.104 Such overlap of powers within 
NEPA could potentially contaminate the sanctity of these roles 
and legitimacy of the institution, and thus, weaken the rule of 
law. There is another conflict of interest in the dual mandates of 
the competent authorities that are required to advance 
economic development in their sectors but also to manage 
environmental risk of projects.105 
 
2. Independent audit and performance review 
 
 
99 NEPA 2007 § 53 and 54. 
100 EAA 2000 § 33.1. See also NEC list of activities identified by NEC that 
require the competent authorities to screen and issue environmental 
clearance, http://www.nec.gov.bt/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Activities-
exempted.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2021). 
101 NEPA 2007 § 30 (a-g). 
102 NEPA 2007 § 36. 
103 Id. 
104 The Constitution for the Kingdom of Bhutan 2008, art. 1 §13: ‘There shall 
be separation of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary and no 
encroachment of each other's powers is permissible except to the extent 
provided for by this Constitution.’ 
105 Antonia Gawel & Irum Ahsan, Review and Compendium of Environmental 
policies and laws in Bhutan 10 (Asian Development Bank,2014),  
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/150136/review-





This identifies the role of independent audit and review 
mechanisms to evaluate the effectiveness of implementation 
and enforcement processes as being crucial to improve 
institutional practice.106 Agency audits and performance reviews 
are conducted in a number of ways in Bhutan. According to new 
guidelines, the annual performance rating of agencies leading 
the national development agenda under the 12th Five-Year plan 
is conducted against ‘Agency Key Results Areas’ and 
corresponding ‘Performance Indicators’.107 In addition, the Royal 
Audit Authority carries out performance,108 regulatory, 
financial,109 and compliance audits.110 Such audits can clearly 
help to identify institutional limitations, analyse the efficiency of 
government programs and  regulatory approaches, as well as 
curb resource misuse, misconduct and corruption within 
agencies.111 
 
3. Collection and use of reliable data 
 
The collection and use of reliable data, refers to the need for 
institutions to undertake this function for the purpose of 
adopting regulations and environmental standards as well as for 
determining compliance and improving environmental 
 
106 UNEP, supra note 55, at 77;  see also, OECD, Supreme Audit Institutions and 
Good Governance: Oversight, Insight and Foresight, OECD Public Governance 
Reviews (2016),http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264263871-en (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2021). 
107 Royal Government of Bhutan, 12th Five Year Plan Guidelines 
(2017),https://www.gnhc.gov.bt/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Finalized-
Guideline.pdf(last visited Jul. 27, 2020). 
108 The Constitution for the Kingdom of Bhutan 2008, art. 25 § 1 and The 
Audit Act of Bhutan 2018 § 68. (independent review of government program, 
operations, or management system to ensure appropriate use of resources 
and the improvement in public services performance). 
109 The Audit Act of Bhutan 2018 § 73: (reviews compliance of financial 
statement of agencies with financial reporting standards and regulatory 
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110 The Audit Act of Bhutan 2018 § 74:(compliance audit focuses on a range 
of issues related to entity’s compliance with law, regulations, policies and 
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performance.112 Greater transparency and the disclosure of 
environmental information also have the effect of garnering 
public trust.113 Unfortunately due to the lack of adequate 
environmental baseline data, it is difficult to monitor the 
progress of projects and changes in environmental conditions in 
Bhutan.114 While the NEC recognizes the right to information and 
the secretariat publishes periodic state of the environment 
reports115 and other related information, the approach of 
information sharing may be largely top-down. However, 
initiatives such as the ‘Government-to-Citizen Application’ offer 
innovative approaches to improve citizens’ access to 
government information in a non-discriminatory, time-efficient, 
and cost-effective way.116 Such initiatives in turn may improve 
public appreciation of changes in environmental quality due to 
government interventions and grow public confidence.      
 
4. Coordination across sectors and institutions 
 
It has already been emphasised in section 3.1 that Bhutan has 
incorporated particular methods of achieving meaningful 
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coordination across agencies at multiple-levels and multiple 
sectors. There are compelling arguments that tackling this issue 
can improve a government’s effectiveness by unifying efforts 
and pooling expertise.117 In many  countries, coordination 
among environmental institutions has been particularly difficult 
due to the creation of separate ministries for different natural 
resources competing for limited resources.118 As a cross-
ministerial independent decision-making body, the NEC can call 
upon specialized ministries or agencies (designated as 
‘Competent Authorities’) for assistance in fulfilling its mandate, 
including the coordination and monitoring of cross-sectoral 
issues related to the use of natural resources.119 ‘Competent 
Authorities’ are designated by the NEC at both the national and 
the Dzongkhag level which may facilitate vertical and horizontal 
coordination among these agencies.120 This cross-ministerial 
yet autonomous nature of the NEC is a defining feature of 
Bhutan’s environmental institutional framework. It allows it to 
respond to multi-dimensional and interconnected aspects of the 
environment while avoiding fragmented jurisdiction or 
regulatory overlap or underlap that could undermine its overall 
objectives.  
It can be argued that this analysis demonstrates that 
Bhutan could potentially use the concept of ERoL as elaborated 
in the ERoL Report to analyse existing institutional practices. 
The process could be used as a tool to advance the GNH 
principles relating to environmental protection and associated 
governance.   
 
C. Anti-Corruption Commission 
 
 
117 Scott Fulton and Antonio Herman Benjamin, Foundations of Sustainability 
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In terms of the effective implementation of environmental law, 
the ERoL Report provides commentary relating to methods of 
tackling corruption which will be noted here, and related to the 
steps taken by Bhutan in this regard. The ERoL Report 
emphasizes that strong leadership is essential to create more 
transparent and accountable environmental institutions that 
prevent and penalize corruption.121 Because corruption is of 
great national concern, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) 
was enshrined in the Constitution as an independent authority. 
In fact, the ACC was established in 2005 by a Royal Decree to 
proactively address corruption before parliamentary democracy 
was fully adopted.122 In this regard, Bhutan aims to lead by 
example, and mandates the ACC to mainstream integrity, ethics, 
and anti-corruption as the key institutional norms through 
capacity-building, education, and value creation among leaders 
and public servants.123 The Constitution also places a duty upon 
citizens to act against corruption.124 In addition specific 
legislation provides for the protection of witnesses, 
complainants, and whistle-blowers.125 It has been argued that 
the country could go further in terms of legislation to protect 
journalists and the press in general from reprisals and 
defamation cases.126 As part of its investigative functions, the 
ACC also conducts independent expert investigations in order to 
detect and deter malfeasance.127 The findings from ACC 
investigations provide the basis for the prosecution of 
 
121 UNEP, supra note 5, at 78-79. (In order to achieve environmental rule of 
law, three aspects of leadership are critical, namely: 1) political will to 
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individuals, parties, or organizations and are undertaken by the 
Office of Attorney General.128 
The role of an independent auditing and review 
mechanism is complementary to ensure implementation and 
enforcement of anti-corruption practices. Further, since 2009, 
four National Integrity Assessments (NIA) have been also 
conducted through an institutional collaboration between the 
ACC and the National Statistics Bureau (NSB) to assess the 
internal integrity, fairness, and transparency in the services 
provided by public agencies.129 The 2019 NIA report highlights 
the key factors of weak institutional practice: these can include 
nepotism and favouritism in public service,  the disregard for 
standard procedures and code of conduct by public servants, 
and a weak accountability culture vis-à-vis corrective action 
against abuse of power and whistle-blower protection.130 All of 
these concerns with weak mechanisms for redress can 
potentially dilute public trust in agencies and weaken their 
capacity to achieve their objectives. 
It appears that the steps that Bhutan has taken in this 
regard are generally consistent with the concept of ERoL as 
elaborated in the ERoL Report. However, it is not possible within 
the scope of this paper to provide comprehensive or in-depth 
analysis.  
  
IV. Access to Justice 
 
Another core aspect of the concept of ERoL as elaborated in the 
ERoL Report relates to access to justice and the extent to which 
dispute resolution mechanisms are accessible, fair, impartial 
and effective.131 This section considers the ways that Bhutan 
has put in place measures to achieve access to justice in relation 
to challenges and disputes concerning environmental matters.  
Prior to analysing the relevant law and institutions, it is 
 
128 The Constitution for the Kingdom of Bhutan 2008, Art 27 § 5.  
129 ACC, National Integrity Assessment 2019 (2020): (“The services provided 
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necessary to consider the cultural context within which this area 
must be viewed. The first major factor that needs to be borne in 
mind is that the court system under the national Constitution is 
relatively new. The second is that traditionally it was less likely 
for Bhutanese citizens to challenge authority than may have 
been the case in some other cultures; though this may now be 
gradually changing.132 Thirdly, it is important to note that the 
principle of GNH itself influences the approach of the judiciary 
to the environment itself and that can potentially affect their 
responses to issues related to access to justice in 
environmental matters. These aspects will be highlighted in the 
following analysis.  
Of fundamental importance to the ‘rule of law’ and 
correspondingly the concept of ERoL, is the establishment of an 
independent judiciary. Art. 21(1) of the Constitution states that, 
‘[t]he Judiciary shall safeguard, uphold, and administer Justice 
fairly and independently without fear, favour, or undue delay in 
accordance with the Rule of Law to inspire trust and confidence 
and to enhance access to Justice.’ Art. 21(18) states that, 
‘[e]very person has the right to approach the courts in matters 
arising out of the Constitution or other laws subject to section 
23 of Article 7.’133 The absence of environmental cases being 
heard by the Supreme Court to date, is an indication that as yet 
this provision has not been properly tested. 
While there could be questions of interpretation as to the 
extent to which citizens are entitled to bring environmental 
cases before the court, they appear to have been answered 
through specific developments that took place in 2016.134 That 
year it was announced that there were plans to permit public 
interest litigation (PIL) solely for environmental issues to a 
‘green bench’ of the High Court.135 The establishment of a ‘Green 
Bench’ to hear environmental cases including class actions was 
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in itself a signal of intent by the Government.136 The Supreme 
Court also enshrined special procedures for the ‘Green Bench’ in 
order to render speedy, fair and just adjudication of all 
environmental disputes.137 Those procedures state explicitly 
that, ‘a citizen has the constitutional right to seek remedy and 
compliance for the violation of the responsibility enshrined in the 
Constitution.’138 The NEC and numerous  other state authorities 
have the power to bring environmental matters before the court 
which means that an infrastructure is in place to respond to 
environmental claims and violations of the law.  
To date there have not been any cases heard before the 
‘Green Bench’ of the High Court. Therefore, to understand the 
approach that is being adopted towards environmental litigation 
by the judicial branch of government, it is necessary to analyse 
the ‘Draft Green Benchbook’ which provides an indication of the 
judicial processes that are under consideration. It includes 
interesting provisions related to locus standi and the 
environmental principles that may prevail.139 
In its current form, the Draft Green Benchbook confirms 
that  the High Court would be the designated court of first 
instance in all environmental matters,140 and that the Supreme 
Court may sua sponte or on an application by the Attorney 
General or a party, withdraw a case pending before the High 
Court involving a substantial question of law of general 
importance to dispense of the case itself.141 It states that in 
departure from the established requirement of individual legal 
standing, PIL ‘may be filed relating to all environmental cases’. 
The ‘Green Bench’ is empowered to determine the 
appropriateness of PIL in a given case at the conclusion of a 
show cause hearing.’142  
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Where the Draft Green Benchbook illustrates Bhutan’s 
individual approach to environmental cases, it proposes that the 
‘Green Bench’ would be expected to apply the principles and 
country priorities in their judgments. It states that, all inquiries, 
proceedings, and trials shall be conducted expeditiously in 
accordance with section 75(a) of the Civil and Criminal 
Procedure Code.143 It then states quite significantly that, ‘[t]he 
Judiciary shall endeavour to ensure that judges have the right 
values and attitudes in giving effect to constitutional and legal 
rights and ensure the tools and techniques to develop preventive 
jurisprudence to avert irreversible environmental damage.’144 
This particular feature does appear to lend a sense of priority to 
the protection of the environment. These provisions combined 
could be seen as a manifestation of the principle of GNH and 
would also appear to be consistent with the concept of ERoL in 
relation to access to justice.  
However, the most prominent guidance to judges in the 
Draft Green Benchbook that arguably indicates consistency with 
the concept of ERoL with regards to access to justice is found in 
‘Salient Feature No. 7,’ which states that,  
 
[p]rocedure for the Green Bench shall be guided by the 
principles of natural justice and not be bound by the rules of 
evidence in the Evidence Act of Bhutan, 2005. In applying the 
precautionary principle, polluter pays principle the burden of 
proof shall be shifted to the person or body interfering with 
ecology to prove no adverse impact.145 
 
More than any other provision, this clearly indicates the intention 
to ensure that the judiciary follows principles in their application 
of justice that are consistent with GNH and the concept of ERoL. 
To dictate that the principles of ‘natural justice’ rather than the 
Evidence Act should be adhered to would provide the ‘Green 
Bench’ with a significant level of discretion in terms of the 
evidence that they could admit, the eligibility of witnesses able 
to give evidence and the manner in which evidence would be put 
to the court. Additionally, in shifting the burden of proof from the 
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complainant to the person or body ‘interfering with ecology,’ the 
Draft Green Benchbook provides a more direct pathway to 
justice than in other jurisdictions, where environmental 
complainants bear the burden of proof. A defining concept 
found in the ERoL Report is the expectation that environmental 
law should respond not only to actual harm, but also to potential 
risks and the likelihood of harm to the human environment and 
non-human species.146 Therefore the inclusion of the 
precautionary and preventive principles within the procedures of 
the Draft Green Benchbook illustrates the consonance that 
exists between the Bhutanese approach and that is stated in the 
ERoL Report. Having said this, the lack of cases through which 
these principles can be analysed in practice does mean that the 
potential of the Green Bench has yet to be observed or realised 
in practice. 
Finally, in this section consideration will be given to the 
sole precedent heard by the Supreme Court relating to a 
challenge based on a provision of the Constitution. It came 
about in the case of The Government of Bhutan v Opposition 
Party (2011),147 and it highlighted the role of the Opposition Party 
under the Constitution. In the case, which related to vehicle 
taxes, the Opposition Party challenged the introduction of a 
specific tax. What is pertinent in this case is that the Supreme 
Court held that the Opposition Party, under its responsibilities 
found in Art. 18(1) of the Constitution which requires it inter alia 
to, ‘play a constructive role to ensure that the Government and 
the ruling party function in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution’, was able to make this particular type of challenge 
as the tax had been levied without tabling it as a bill in 
Parliament. The Supreme Court determined that  the Opposition 
Party does not need to show that it is ‘aggrieved’ and as such it 
was able to  file such cases to ensure that it could carry out its 
democratic function.148 Although this case does not relate to the 
 
146 UNEP, supra note 5, at 17-18. 
147 Judgement No.SC (Hung 11-1), 
http://www.judiciary.gov.bt/html/case/Judg/2011/englishj.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2016). 
148 Judgement No.SC (Hung 11-1), Para. 5.1. of the ‘Court Findings’, 
http://www.judiciary.gov.bt/html/case/Judg/2011/englishj.pdf (last 




environmental pillar of GNH, it does demonstrate the Supreme 
Court’s intention to realise the rule of law in Bhutan in a way that 




The analysis in this article has highlighted different aspects of 
the relationship between GNH and the concept of ERoL within 
the context of certain representative components that make up 
the system of environmental law and governance in Bhutan. The 
following summarises the main findings from this research in 
response to the three categories of enquiry that were posed in 
the introduction.  
Firstly, it is clear that there are laws, principles, 
institutions and practices in Bhutan that are entirely consistent 
with those that are advocated within the ERoL Report. These 
include the rights-based approach to environmental protection 
and human health that is found within the national constitution 
and national law.  It also includes the development of 
institutions that adopt cross-sectoral approaches to 
environmental decision-making, and environmental laws and 
policies that include well-established principles of 
environmental law.  
Secondly, the concept of ERoL as iterated in the ERoL 
Report provides a tool for reviewing environmental institutions. 
This can be useful in analysing the functions of institutions and 
in this instance the very basic review that was undertaken 
suggested that prima facie at least, there are areas where further 
work is needed. For example, the lack of clarity and confluence 
of judicial and executive functions of the NEC, has the potential 
to undermine its effectiveness if it is carrying out functions that 
run contrary to the principle of separation of powers. Also, the 
extent to which the constitutional right to information has been 
realised in practice appears to be only in the early stages of 
development. This demonstrates the usefulness of the concept 
of ERoL in analysing the functioning of institutions methodically.  
Thirdly, there are aspects of the approach adopted by 
Bhutan in a range of areas that go beyond what is explicitly or 
implicitly advocated in the ERoL Report. By adopting an 




(through GNH), Bhutan’s outlook and commitment to 
environmental protection as a means to collective happiness 
and well-being go further than those assumed or expected 
within the ERoL Report. For instance, the strict constitutional 
protection of Bhutan’s national forests through the national 
constitution is unique. Furthermore, the Buddhist belief of 
respecting and honouring life in all forms that informs the GNH 
environmental pillar goes beyond the socio-economic and 
political considerations found in the ERoL Report. Bhutan in 
adopting these policies has achieved negative carbon 
emissions, high levels of biodiversity protection, and low levels 
of pollution. Therefore, in this regard, the analysis shows that 
there are lessons that other countries can learn from Bhutan’s 
approach to environmental protection. It also demonstrates that 
assumptions relating to economic development made within the 
ERoL Report quite possibly need to be revisited. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of this brief survey 
examining the relationship between GNH and the concept of 
ERoL, certain tentative conclusions can be drawn. It does appear 
that the concept of ERoL as stated in the ERoL Report can 
usefully be applied to certain institutional aspects of 
environmental governance in Bhutan to further GNH objectives. 
All the same, the concept of ERoL, which has its core focus on 
implementation and enforcement, is not a panacea to achieving 
protection of the environment on its own. This survey also notes 
that the assumptions about developmental trajectories 
embedded in the ERoL Report may not apply to a country like 
Bhutan and other countries that have a unique and/or more 
holistic approach to sustainable development. It has also 
demonstrated that in specific aspects of environmental 
governance, Bhutan has demonstrated clear leadership and in 
this regard the concept of GNH potentially has much to offer 
future iterations of the concept of ERoL.  
It is clear that further research is required to analyse 
this relationship and to fully appreciate the synergies between 
the two frameworks.  
